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Introduction 
During the peak of the financial crisis in late 2008, the 
Economist began one of its article sections by inviting 
readers to view ‘Smoot-Hawley in the rear mirror’ (The 
Economist, 2008). In effect, it sought to use a simple visual 
metaphor in order to bring the 1930s into the present and 
emphasize the dangers of protectionism. With the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers some two years behind us, the time 
has come to view such appeals to history as part of a 
broader socio-historical phenomenon: after all, more than 
any before it, the crisis of 2008 was marked by a violent 
return of the past to the capitalist imaginary. 
On a superficial level, this has not gone unnoticed, and in 
the academic literature it is now routine for articles to 
begin by acknowledging a return of the 1930s to contem-
porary debate. But if ‘the Great Depression analogy refuses 
to go away’, as historians Michael Bordo and Harold James 
have rightly observed (2010: 127, emphasis added), then it 
is for reasons that few have found cause to investigate. 
Indeed, the fundamental puzzle opened up by the return 
of the past (What is its function? Why has it occurred in 
this present?), has yet to even find the form of a question. 
The purpose of this paper is to grasp together these two 
paradoxical developments, and to ask what they might 
mean for our theories and histories of finance and crisis. In 
order to do this, I take inspiration from attempts to under-
stand historiography through psychoanalytic concepts, 
using the idea of a ‘return of the repressed’ to construct a 
new meta-history of the recent crisis. 
For Freud, the ‘return of the repressed’ operates at the 
level of the individual subject, and it is marked by the dou-
ble-occurrence of a traumatizing event, requiring the con
tingent incidence of two or more psychic shocks that are 
seen to be affiliated with one another. For Lacan, however, 
it is a persistent and trans-individual phenomenon that can 
be traced back to the traumatic constitution of the subject, 
which is as inevitable as symbolic order itself. At least ini-
tially, then, it would appear that Freud and Lacan provide 
quite distinct theories of ‘return’, and that neither have 
much to offer us in the way of tools for approaching His-
tory.1 But as Hayden White has recently pointed out, 
Freud’s theory has a distinctly historical element which, 
among other things, invites us to interrogate the kind of 
‘schizo-historiology’ (2008: 28) through which an individ-
ual or group might become obsessed with the past, and 
yet remain unable or unwilling to confront it. Meanwhile, 
as Michel de Certeau has suggested, the establishment of 
History as a modern science has involved the same kind of 
foundational loss that Lacan associated with our entrance 
into language, requiring historians to repeatedly disavow 
their own past in order to remain ‘authorized to speak in 
the name of the “real”’ (1986: 208). Taken together, these 
points suggest that if we focus on the groups of individuals 
that are constituted through specific historiographical 
operations, then there is a potential synergy between psy-
choanalysis and our object of interest. 
Taking this synergy as its starting point, this paper provides 
a reading of how the past has come to acquire such a 
strange presence during the crisis of 2008. Using de 
Certeau’s methods to address White’s puzzle, it focuses 
how the past has figured within three fields of scientific 
enterprise: namely, financial economics, economic history, 
and constructivist or cultural political economy. It argues 
that each of these fields – which are central to our under-
standing of financial crisis, and thus implicated in the con-
temporary operations of capitalist historiography – have 
been structured around an exclusion of the ‘practical past’, 
and that this has been revealed by the crisis of 2008. It 
then suggests that in order to move beyond the ‘schizo-
historiology’ of recent years, crisis theory must confront 
this history of exclusion and begin to come to terms with it 
by creating a place for the practical past within its visions 
of History. 
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Thesis I: History is the repressed other of 
financial economics 
Neoclassical economics in general and modern finance theory 
in particular has sought to exclude historical time from its 
models. This has long been observed and criticised by hetero-
dox scholars, who have sought instead to situate finance 
within history, but the sequential logic of chronological time 
has still continued to function as a limit to historical thought. 
Since the ‘marginalist revolution’ of the late nineteenth 
century, economics has been indelibly shaped by the rise of 
formalism. Although Menger was in many ways a subjec-
tivist, both Jevons and Walras saw themselves as mathe-
matical theorists, and the radical change their work pro-
duced was a ‘penetration of mathematical discourse into 
economic theory’ (Mirowski, 1984: 362). In the wake of 
this change, modern physics became a model for economic 
science, and mechanical models of equilibrium – which 
entailed an impoverished conception of temporality – be-
came the basis for a neoclassical turn in both micro and 
macro economics. For example, in the influential model of 
‘general equilibrium’ put forward by Léon Walras, all mar-
kets are born equal, and equilibration is an immanent 
tendency which is set in motion by external change. Time 
is reduced to a path for variables, and the change that 
prompts adjustment remains a mystery, as does the histori-
cal genesis of the market system itself. 
Of course, the world of economic thought has never been 
as homogenous or closed as the one envisioned by general 
equilibrium theory, but following its introduction into the 
field, formalism came to acquire a kind of ‘ecological 
dominance’ in the study of capitalist economics.2 For ex-
ample, in addition to recruiting a new generation of schol-
ars to neoclassical theory, it also served to influence the 
development of Marxian economics, luring it into an in-
creasingly technical debate over production, which by 
some accounts turned out to be quite unproductive. Even 
more visibly, though, it was able to domesticate Keynesian 
theory, transforming it into the infamous ‘IS-LM’ model of 
the neo-classical synthesis. Hence, despite the persistence 
of a range of more subtle approaches to historical time 
within political economy, it has become possible to tell 
plausible stories about ‘how economics forgot history’ 
(Hodgson, 2001). 
In the study of finance, the transformation has been espe-
cially pronounced. Again, while one can certainly unearth a 
long string of heterodox theories, mainstream approaches 
have come to view finance as a market for loanable funds 
which tends towards equilibrium. Jan Toporowski has 
characterized the 1960s as a kind of tipping point in this 
process, arguing that finance theory has since been re-
duced to ‘the most abstract and other-worldly axioms of 
pre-Keynesian microeconomics’ (2000: 2). Meanwhile, 
Duncan Wigan has observed a similar ‘expurgation’ of 
Keynesian ideas, emphasizing how modern portfolio the-
ory has transformed uncertainty into an object of calcula-
tion (2009: 160-63). Insofar as this development has its 
roots in probability and general equilibrium theory, it re-
produces the reduction of time to ‘inter-temporal choice’ 
that defines formal microeconomics more generally. But as 
Wigan points out, it also involves a fantasy of finance 
without history – in the form of a world with ‘fungible 
prices for all times, places and things’ (2009: 161) – which 
has been central to the rise of modern financial derivatives. 
Somewhat ironically, then, the near-total annihilation of 
time within mainstream finance theory has coincided with 
the emergence of a finance industry which trades almost 
exclusively in claims on the future. 
The fundamental consequence of this is that conventional 
financial economics has been unable to comprehend the 
historical dynamics of capitalist development and crisis. Of 
course, heterodox scholars have long been aware of this 
shortcoming, but even their attempts to situate finance 
within history have been hampered by a limited conception 
of historical time. In post-Keynesian theory, for example, to 
be within history is simply to be carried forward by the 
flight of time’s arrow. This idea, which can be traced back 
to the work of Joan Robinson in the 1960s and 1970s, was 
both presented and received as a basic critique of neoclas-
sical economics. Contrasting the smooth mechanics of 
equilibrium theory with the ‘turbulence of actual history’, 
Robinson argued that a model based on the former would 
sink the moment it was ‘set afloat in historical time’ (1977: 
1332, 1323). In other words, its assumptions and axioms 
would always be immediately nullified by ‘an ever-moving 
break between the irrevocable past and the unknown 
future’ (Robinson, 1977: 1322). 
The theoretical legacy of this critique has been twofold. 
Firstly, within mainstream economics, there has been a 
renewed attention to context and process, as evidenced in 
the literatures on spatial agglomeration, scale effects and 
path dependency; and secondly, on the margins of the 
field, there has been a revival of older traditions that were 
always suspicious of equilibrium doctrine, as evidenced in 
the emergence of post-Keynesian institutionalism. These 
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are quite distinct legacies, but both nevertheless reproduce 
the flaw inherent in Robinson’s conception of time and the 
past. Specifically, by emphasising the difference between 
logical and historical time, Robinson reduces historical time 
to chronological time, thereby obscuring the subtlety of 
historical change, and the role that the living past might 
play in such a process. Michael Turk puts it well when he 
suggests that ‘the set nature of the past ... must be tem-
pered by its retrospective reconstruction as history, [which 
is] affected in turn by ... the comprehension, conscious-
ness, and memory of it’ (2010: 489). Neither of the two 
strands of work indicated above has achieved this. On the 
one hand, both the ‘new historical’ and ‘new institutional’ 
economics are too focused on the literal bequest of the 
past to the present, conceiving of institutions as either 
‘carriers of history’ or machines for uncertainty-reduction. 
Meanwhile, by focusing on the strictly forward-moving 
evolution of legal and financial structures, scholars working 
within Veblenian or Minskyan traditions have failed to ask 
whether historical time might loop back on itself. Thus, even 
after Robinson’s critique, the idea of history in economics 
remains ensnared by a sequential logic. History, however, is 
fraught with strange loops. 
Thesis II: Fiction is the repressed other 
of economic history 
For some time now, the study of history has been conceived as 
an objective and scientific enterprise. Since the 1960s, however, 
philosophers and meta-historians have steadily undermined 
this vision, emphasising the necessary and productive relation 
between fiction and history. This insight has yet to find its way 
into the mainstream of economic and financial history, where 
it remains obscured by neoclassical frameworks and cliometric 
methods. 
The story of history and narrative goes back a long way, 
and it has already been reconstructed in a number of influ-
ential meta-histories. For our purposes, the key point is 
that in the wake of new theories of language and dis-
course, various thinkers began to ask what it might mean 
to use the same word – ‘history’ – to connote both a series 
of phenomena, and the narration of that series. Before 
long, this line of questioning produced a pronounced shift 
in the substance of methodological debate surrounding 
history, and gave rise to a new concern with the relation 
between time, narrative and historical consciousness. The 
scope of this literature is now vast, but its origins can be 
traced back to the pioneering work of Hayden White and 
Paul Ricoeur. 
Hayden White has become famous for emphasizing the 
function of narrativity in historical study, and the necessar-
ily fictional representation of reality implicit in narrativized 
histories. In his The Content of the Form, for example – 
which is a collection of essays dating back to 1980 – he 
makes the point that although past events, structures and 
processes may indeed have really existed in one present or 
another, a plot is something that can only be imposed 
upon them through acts of selection and figuration that 
are essentially imaginative and retrospective. Moreover, it is 
precisely such a narrative form, he argues, that enables us 
to endow a series of factual statements about the past 
with a properly historical meaning and significance. For 
White, then, narrative discourse has a trans-historical truth-
producing function at the level of the social, and when 
belief in this power begins to wane, ‘the entire cultural 
edifice of a society enters into crisis’ (1987: x). The coher-
ence of history, in other words, hinges on the ability of 
historians to tell plausible stories, and the past is a resource 
they are impelled to draw upon in this pursuit. 
Paul Ricoeur also observed the structural unity of fictional 
and historical narrative, but rather than a kind of meta-
code, he saw narrativity as something rooted in our being 
‘within-time’. Specifically, drawing upon Aristotle, St. 
Augustine and Heidegger, Ricoeur emphasized the inter-
twinement of experiential and historical time through nar-
rative. In one respect, plot is something that allows us to 
experience time as something other than a series of unre-
lated instants: that is to say, in both sequencing and con-
figuring these instants, it ‘provides a transition from 
within-time-ness to historicality’ (1980: 178). And yet by 
virtue of this very function, plot is also something that is 
always-already in a process of development, and within 
which we necessarily find ourselves enmeshed: ‘Historicity 
… comes to language only so far as we tell stories or tell 
history’, but at the same time, ‘We belong to history be-
fore telling stories or writing history’ (1981: 294). For Ri-
coeur, then, emplotment is not only a figuration of tempo-
rality as such, but also an act that refigures the time of the 
present within which human action must always occur. 
The coherence of life itself, then, hinges on our ability to 
see the present through the lens of narrative time. 
Despite their differences, what both White and Ricoeur 
effectively underline is the interpretive interdependence of 
events disjoined by chronological time. If narrative alone 
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can invest history with meaning or time with history, then 
because narrativity entails the ‘grasping together’ of more 
than one event, all events contained within a narrative 
necessarily find their historical meaning in relation to one 
another. Moreover, because history never quite stops – 
that is to say, because the arrow of chronological time 
continues to fly forward – new events can always destabi-
lize old narrative understandings by prompting a re-
emplotment of the past. In this way, then, both White and 
Ricoeur speak directly to the debate on time in economic 
theory. Specifically, they suggest that there can never be a 
final word on the past because its mutability is precisely 
what enables Robinson’s ‘ever-moving break’ to be trans-
formed into historical consciousness. Conversely, and in 
light of this, Robinson’s concern with the destructive effect 
of time upon models should alert us to the practical func-
tion of narrative in the face of crisis. 
Unfortunately, even though each of these debates has 
been influential in their respective fields, neither has en-
gaged the other, and their co-produced insight into the 
fundamentally practical function of past has yet to pene-
trate the discipline of economic history. As we have seen, 
the broad legacy of Robinson’s critique has been a new 
institutional turn in the study of economics, accompanied 
by a somewhat less visible return to the old institutional-
isms of the early twentieth century. But if the latter re-
mains the preserve of heterodox political economists, the 
success of the former has been achieved through its appli-
cation of neoclassical tools to history. In methodological 
terms, this has prevented the renaissance in narrative his-
tory from reaching economics, which in turn has served to 
keep the relation between history and fiction from view. 
As Michel de Certeau rightly points out, in the wake of the 
Great Depression, the writing of history becomes the writ-
ing of economic history. But one consequence of the rising 
neoclassical tide during the 1930s was a sea change in the 
study of economic history itself: the so-called cliometric 
revolution. Taking shape in the 1960s under the leadership 
of figures such as Douglass North and Robert Fogel, this 
‘revolution’ saw a new cohort of economists come to his-
tory armed with a combination of neoclassical price theory 
and statistical technique. For these scholars, history was an 
objective science, and the past was ‘a giant experiment 
station for economic ideas’ (Goldin, 1995: 191). Hence, at 
the same time that Robinson was arguing that a ‘new 
historical economics’ was needed in order to overcome the 
limits of neoclassical formalism, cliometricians were already 
in the process of developing one by bringing a hypertro-
phic version of that formalism into historical study. At least 
in the US, then, economic historians took flight from the 
narrative form just as other historians did the opposite. In 
terms of financial history, this development can be seen in 
the literature on the Great Depression, where the land-
mark study of Friedman and Schwartz helped to inaugu-
rate a shift from the tales of Galbraith and Kindleberger to 
the tests of Temin, Eichengreen, Bernanke, Bordo and 
Calomiris. 
Of course, even cliometrics involves recourse to style, 
metaphor and story. But to focus strictly on the rhetoric of 
economic historians would be to miss a broader transfor-
mation in the emplotment of economic history itself. Spe-
cifically, with the formalisation of theoretical and historical 
economics, plot has been pushed out of written academic 
history. This has undermined the ability of individual histo-
ries to perform the narrative function, which in turn has 
forced narrative practice onto a higher plane of abstrac-
tion. Moreover, in this space between histories, the theo-
ries of White and Ricoeur encounter their own limit: What, 
we might ask, are the practices that enable cliometric find-
ings to form the basis properly narrative understanding, 
and precisely how do these practices interact with the 
living plots of History? While some post-Keynesians have 
begun to approach this question by casting the history of 
economic thought as an input into historical process, prac-
tical historiography has yet to be conceived in similar 
terms. Thus, despite key changes in the study of historiog-
raphy, economics remains largely oblivious to the fiction of 
history, producing an entirely new puzzle for the meta-
historian. 
Thesis III: Historiography is the 
repressed other of crisis theory 
In recent years, political economists have begun to acknowl-
edge the fictive dimension of crisis by focusing on processes of 
construal and social construction. But in seeking to root such 
processes within a historically specific conjuncture, they have 
ended up obscuring the intersubjective constitution of historic-
ity itself. 
Much like ‘history’, the very notion of ‘crisis’ contains a rich 
and productive ambiguity: It connotes a critical juncture 
that requires decisive action, but it also indicates how such 
action requires subjective intervention. In contemporary 
(International) Political Economy, this has led scholars to 
consider crises as potentially transformative moments in 
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which interpretive struggle conditions institutional evolu-
tion. Mark Blyth, for example, has consistently argued that 
agents need ideas in order to make sense of a crisis, and 
that this in turn situates ideological contestation at the 
base of any subsequent institutional change (see 2002: 27-
37). More recently, like-minded scholars have begun to 
focus more closely on the practices and processes through 
which one interpretation of a crisis may come to prevail 
over another (see Widmaier et al., 2007). Blyth himself has 
written on ‘inter-elite attempts at persuasion’, which he 
suggests are waged in the name of various ‘crisis-defining 
ideas’ (2007: 761), while Leonard Seabrooke has argued 
that these inter-elite debates may be held to account by 
‘everyday discourses constructed by mass public agents’ 
(2007: 795). In this ‘constructivist’ perspective, a crisis is 
not simply an event that agents perceive as necessitating 
institutional change; it is one that also serves to ‘ignite 
processes of persuasion’ both within and across different 
institutional domains (Widmaier et al., 2007: 749). 
Colin Hay has also observed the subjective indeterminacy 
of crisis, but drawing on Marxist state theory, he conceives 
of decisive subjective intervention as a contingent and non-
necessary response to the objectively over-determined 
failure of an economic regime (see 1999: 323-327). Before 
a crisis as such can be said to exist, he argues, the various 
contradictions that underpin systemic failure must be dis-
cursively recruited as ‘symptoms’ and incorporated into a 
‘meta-narrative of crisis’ (Hay, 1999: 333ff.). However, 
once such a meta-narrative does emerge, it opens up an 
uneven space of struggle between itself and other compet-
ing narratives, mapping-out a ‘discursively selective terrain’ 
that privileges some constructions of crisis over others 
(Hay, 1996: 261). Hence, for Hay the very constitution of a 
crisis moment is itself a moment of crisis, and initial meta-
narratives articulated in the media can be decisive in de-
termining the nature of any subsequent institutional trans-
formation. 
More recently, Bob Jessop has sought to incorporate Hay’s 
notion of ‘discursive selectivity’ into a more avowedly 
Gramscian theory of crisis by situating it alongside his own 
notion of ‘structural selectivity’. In this ‘cultural political 
economy’ perspective, once the contradictions of a capital-
ist social formation are construed as constituting a systemic 
crisis, there is a proliferation of different ‘economic imagi-
naries’ across a variety of sites and scales. These imaginar-
ies are then subject to mechanisms of selection, retention, 
and institutionalization that include both discursive and 
extra-discursive factors (Jessop, 2004: 162-166). A crisis 
therefore, is a potential moment of hegemonic transforma-
tion during which different agents vie to re-make social 
relations from within (see Jessop and Sum, 2006). 
By way of summary, it would be fair to say that for Blyth, 
Hay and Jessop alike, a crisis gives rise to a necessarily 
circumscribed but fundamentally underdetermined process 
of meaning-making that conditions any subsequent institu-
tional transformations.3 For our purposes, however, it is 
important to point out that all three authors emphasize the 
centrality of narration to this process. Hay does this most 
explicitly through his notion of ‘meta-narration’, but the 
other two effectively anchor their key concepts in an ap-
peal to the power of the narrative form. Blyth, for exam-
ple, suggests that ‘attempts at persuasion take the form of 
developing and deploying “causal stories” about the 
economy’ (2007: 762), while Jessop speaks of the need for 
‘productively vague stories that connect past, present, and 
future’ (2008: 83). The logical implication of this is that 
crisis-narratives and the ideas or imaginaries they support 
might very well involve the representation of past crises. 
But despite its immanent presence in the new crisis theory, 
the practical past remains repressed by the prevailing pa-
rameters of meta-theoretical debate. Specifically, due to 
their abiding concern with the relation between ideas and 
material interests, constructivist and cultural political econ-
omy scholars have neglected the role of historical represen-
tation during times of crisis, focusing instead on developing 
a nuanced understanding of the context in which meaning-
making takes place. But if the context of crisis – however 
conceived – conditions the selection and retention of narra-
tives, ideas, or imaginaries, then the relevant features of that 
context are also likely to condition the selection and reten-
tion of historical representations. The implication of this is 
that contemporary crisis theory might actually furnish some 
of the tools needed to address the question of the living and 
practical past. Unfortunately, much like financial and histori-
cal economics, it has been hampered by its carefully negoti-
ated identity and self-image. 
When lined up against equilibrium finance theory and 
cliometrics, contemporary crisis theory in political economy 
looks infinitely better placed to tackle the complexity of 
historical time, and it is. But despite the obvious points of 
epistemological and methodological difference, crisis the-
ory is held back from full engagement through the same 
kind of mechanism that keeps history from finance and 
fiction from history – namely, the disciplining function of 
its field-specific meta-discourse. Constructivist IPE, for 
example, which grew out of constructivism in IR, has been 
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forced to model its challenge on that of its older sibling, 
justifying its right to exist through increasingly banal de-
bates over old dualisms: structure vs. agency, ideas vs. 
interests, materialism vs. ideas, etcetera. Such debates 
were clearly part of an attempt to engage the dominant 
realist and liberal paradigms, and they effectively func-
tioned as a means to make ‘ideas’ safe for IPE, distinguish-
ing constructivism from more radical postmodern theories. 
A consequence of this accession, however, has been an 
empirical bias towards topics that are more easily tractable 
in methodological terms – hence the silence on the (re-) 
construction of the past, where two presents are in play. 
Cultural political economy has had a very different genesis. 
Rather than operating within the parameters of contempo-
rary IPE, its advocates have sought to draw on a ‘pre-
disciplinary’ tradition combining a wide range of different 
theories. But despite this wilful eclecticism, the avowedly 
Gramscian core of the project has meant that all of its 
theoretical imports have effectively been filtered through a 
base-superstructure distinction, becoming distinct tools in 
an ultimately singular quest to think the dialectic of dis-
course and materiality. While such an approach is in no 
way incompatible with questions of practical historical 
interpretation, its emphasis on the difference between 
construal and construction has meant that the ontological 
depth of the present has been its primary theoretical con-
cern. In this way, the debates surrounding Marxian theory 
and philosophy have performed the same function as 
those around ideas and interests in IPE, effectively keeping 
the past from the present in cultural political economy. 
Hence, despite being implied in its theoretical frameworks, 
the new crisis theory has ended up blind to the imaginary 
constitution of historicity. 
The crisis of 2008 and the return of the 
repressed 
The global financial turmoil that erupted in 2008 was ac-
companied by a proliferation of contending explanations, 
effectively placing the idea of crisis at the heart of public 
and academic discourse (see Samman, 2011b). Most 
scholarly accounts of the episode have tended to identify 
the undoing of a particular phase or modality of global 
capitalism, providing us somewhat ironically with an end-
less parade of ‘end-ist’ narratives: the end of greed, the 
end of liberal finance, and the end of money-production; 
the end of neoliberalism, the end of Anglo-Saxon capital-
ism, and the end of debt-driven accumulation. What is 
clearly missing from all of these accounts, however, is an 
acknowledgement of the sustained and widespread appeal 
to the past that has characterized the crisis. As Gillian Tett 
(2007) has rightly observed, even as the problem in sub-
prime markets was just beginning to become visible, those 
on Wall Street were gripped by a ‘violent thirst for histori-
cal knowledge’, seeking parallels and lessons in previous 
crises. And as the crisis spread, so too did this thirst, with 
politicians, technocrats and journalists alike becoming 
obsessed with the 1930s. Indeed, by the time of Lehman’s 
collapse, the Great Depression had become a kind of 
strange historical oracle – a figure or object from the past, 
summoned forth to decode the mystery of the present (see 
Samman, 2011a). In light of this, the events of 2008 
should be recognized not simply as a crisis of global fi-
nance capitalism, but also as a related and broader crisis of 
historical consciousness. Quite simply, the return of the 
past represents a fundamental breakdown in the machin-
ery of capitalist historiography, which has operated 
through a systematic repression of the fiction that neces-
sarily underpins historical understanding. 
In terms of academic economics, this breakdown has been 
revealed in two distinct but related ways. Firstly, a growing 
chorus of orthodox scholars have begun to acknowledge 
their failure to anticipate the crisis. Some have gone so far 
as to announce the onset of a ‘Dark Age’ in macroeco-
nomics (Krugman, 2009), while others have been some-
what more optimistic, observing that ‘in general, history 
rather than economic theory seems to offer a guide in 
interpreting wildly surprising and inherently unpredictable 
events’ (Bordo and James, 2010: 127). Either way, the 
upshot is that the models that failed to predict the crisis – 
and perhaps even helped to cause it – are now being rec-
ognized as uniquely unsuited to the study of historical 
dynamics. Secondly, this basic shortcoming has been reit-
erated by the turn to analogy in policymaking. As some 
have already argued, financial regulation is a fundamen-
tally pragmatic enterprise that rarely involves the neat 
‘application of theory-based prescriptions’ (Nesvetailova & 
Palan, 2010: 808). With the onset of the 2008 crisis, how-
ever, the unprecedented response of policymaking organi-
zations has relied on a thoroughly historical form of prag-
matism, with fiscal and monetary authorities grounding 
their decisions in the ‘lessons’ of the past. For example, in 
the US and the UK, the decision to pursue quantitative-
easing was surrounded by discussions of Japan’s experi-
ence with the technique during the late 1990s. In this way, 
then, the crisis has forced economists and policymakers to 
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recognize the limits to formal modelling, prompting them 
to take the idea of historical knowledge more seriously. 
In terms of economic and financial history, the signs have 
been subtler but no less telling. Quantitative study remains 
alive and well, but its promise to uncover the ‘truth of the 
past’ is buckling under the weight of the competing in-
sights it is proving able to generate. This is especially the 
case when it comes to the Great Depression. Although 
that episode first emerged as the holy grail of financial 
cliometrics during the 1980s, the recent crisis has seen the 
publication of a wealth of new studies that seek to address 
the policy dilemmas of the present. Work in this vein has 
focused on topics as diverse as the relation between mone-
tary policy and asset-price bubbles, the effectiveness of 
monetary and fiscal stimulus, and possible exit strategies 
from crisis-response measures. Of course, when under-
stood as a reflection of the complexity of the Great De-
pression, this diversity is not a challenge to the field. In 
fact, if anything, it shores up the claim to objectivity that 
enabled quantitative history to flourish in the first place. 
But when viewed as an illustration of the sheer multiplicity 
of meaning that the past that can bestow upon the pre-
sent, which it surely is too, then it hints at the kind of his-
torical time that has been systematically repressed within 
the study of economics. Moreover, when situated along-
side other developments in the writing of history, this poly-
valence of the past becomes even more obvious. A quick 
scan of recent financial bestsellers will reveal a return of 
the Great Depression to narrative history, with new revi-
sionist accounts garnering attention in Forbes Magazine at 
the same time as reprinted old classics are celebrated on 
the pages of the Financial Times. In effect, these develop-
ments indicate the increasingly fragile nature of historical 
certainty in economics through the mutability of the past 
in the present. Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2009) recent book 
may have temporarily succeeded in obscuring this, but its 
sarcastic title – This Time is Different – is starting to look as 
though it would be better read literally. In the varying form 
and content of historical representation that the crisis has 
unleashed, it has effectively opened up a new and differ-
ent temporality. And within this wormhole-like present, 
the practical past has become the substance of an ongoing 
and contested historiography. 
In terms of crisis theory, the impact of 2008 still remains to 
be seen. The puzzle of historicity has been brought to the 
fore, but for the time being, the question of practical histo-
riography remains conspicuously absent. In this author’s 
view, one way of addressing this would be to bring meta-
history into crisis theory. As we have seen, the meta-
historical literature on narrative focuses on the interpretive 
interdependence of different historical events, but it has 
failed to address the ongoing and socially situated prac-
tices of historical representation through which this might 
play out in the present. Conversely, the political economy 
literature on crisis does precisely the opposite: it focuses on 
the diverse and contested practices through which an 
unfolding event is ascribed historical meaning, but has yet 
to address the role of past crises in this process. Put differ-
ently, while the former’s concern with the historical past 
has come at the expense of addressing the function of the 
practical past, the latter’s preoccupation with practical 
imagination has come at the expense of addressing what it 
is truly historical about the intersubjective constitution of 
crisis. From the perspective of crisis theory, then, the chal-
lenge is to put the insights of meta-history to work and 
begin treating moments of crisis construal and construc-
tion as something other than unrelated presents in time. 
Bob Jessop (2011) has recently begun to do this, focusing 
on the relation between learning and crisis, and more such 
work is needed. However, in order to come fully to terms 
with the puzzle of historicity, difficult ontological questions 
will need to be posed. The objects of analysis are uncon-
troversial, i.e. the practices of historical representation that 
bring accumulated facts and histories into the interpretive 
orbit of the present. Their relation to that present, though, 
might not be readily grasped through frameworks that 
posit a trans-historical logic of institutional and ideological 
change – after all, what we are dealing with are competing 
abstractions of historical change, generated through the 
recall of more or less distant events. Again, more work 
here is needed, so I leave the question hanging. 
As is only fitting for an essay on the fiction of historical 
science, let us close with an appeal to a deeply historical 
work of science fiction. At one point in William Gibson’s 
Pattern Recognition, the young protagonist Cayce offers 
an unexpected aphorism to a table of avant-garde advertis-
ing executives: 
“The future is there,” Cayce hears herself say, “looking back at 
us. Trying to make sense of the fiction we will have become. And 
from where they are, the past behind us will look nothing at all 
like the past we imagine behind us now.” (Gibson, 2003: 57) 
As the crisis of 2008 recedes into the past, we are in now a 
position to see it for the breakdown of capitalist historiog-
raphy that it was. Going forward, the task is clear. The 
historicality of finance lays splayed out before us, the fic-
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tion of historiology is an open secret, and crisis theory is on 
the cusp of coming to terms with the intersubjective con-
stitution of historicity. The time for the past has come. 
History is there for the remaking. 
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Endnotes 
1Although Freud did attempt to construct a history of the Hebrew 
people using his theories of trauma and repression, this came at 
the cost of a weakened distinction between a person and a 
people (see Moses and Monotheism in Freud, 2001: Vol. 23). 
Meanwhile, as Caroline Williams (2001: 88) has observed, Lacan’s 
structuralism effectively leaves no room for such a ‘phylogenetic 
analysis of history’. 
2The notion of ‘ecological dominance’ employed here is 
borrowed from the work of Bob Jessop (2000). 
3In one way or another, all three authors suggest that perceived 
systemic failures require new ideas; that certain groups might be 
in a better position to articulate these than others; and that all 
agents must speak to and through existing (extra-) discursive 
structures if they are to offer persuasive and actionable maps for 
institutional change. Blyth and Hay tend to restrict their focus to 
national economic systems, whereas Jessop’s framework seeks to 
address multi-scalar processes. 
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